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ABSTRACT
This paper examines pricing policies for OPEC under the assumption that
the cartel is composed of a block of spender countries with large cash
needs and a block of saver countries with little immediate need for cash
and a lower rate of discount. The decision problem for the two-part cartel
is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the optimal bargaining solution
is computed using results from the theory of cooperative games developed by
Nash. The set of feasible bargaining points -- and the corresponding Nash
solution -- is computed under two assumptions on the behavior of output shares:
that they are subject to choice and that they are fixed at historical values.
Our results suggest that for fixed output shares, there is little room for
bargaining and the price path approximates the optimal monopoly price path.
If the shares are subject to control, optimal paths depend significantly on
the relative bargaining power of each block.
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1. Introduction
Recent studies of optimal pricing policies for OPEC have treated the cartel
as a unified group of countries that all have the same objectives, so that the
behavior of the cartel is that of a pure monopolist. Pindyck [13], for example,
developed an optimal pricing model in which OPEC, facing a net demand for oil
that is the difference between a dynamic total demand function and a dynamic
supply function for "competitive fringe" countries, and subject to production
costs that rise as reserves are depleted, sets price over time to maximize its
sum of discounted profits. While studies such as this provide a useful first
approximation to cartel behavior in that they describe how pricing policies
depend on the inherent dynamics of reserve depletion and short-term lag adjust-
ments, they do not account for the fact that many cartels are composed of producers
with different objectives and different degrees of bargaining power. Cartel
"policy" in fact represents a negotiated agreement that reflects the different
interests of the member producers.
OPEC is a good example of a two-part cartel. It consists of one group of
saver countries (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, and
Qatar) that have little immediate need for cash and would thus use a low rate
of discount in computing a sum of discounted profits, and a second group of
spender countries (Iran, Venezuela, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Ecuador)
Optimal pricing models for OPEC have also been constructed recently by Cremer
and Weitzman [2 ] and Kalymon [7 ]. Those models differ from that of Pindyck
in that they do not account for short-term adjustment lags. Non-optimizing
simulation models of OPEC behavior have also been constructed; see for example
Blitzer et al. [1 ].
2with large cash needs and a higher rate of discount. These groups also
happen to differ with respect to the proven reserves available to be depleted
over time; saver countries as a group have considerably greater proven
reserves (a 1975 reserve-production ratio of 57) than do the spender countries
(a 1975 R-P ratio of 28).2 As we will see in this paper, the differences in
discount rates and reserves will reinforce each other in terms of creating
differences in desired policies for each group. Actual cartel policy depends
on an agreement between the two groups that reflects both differences in
objectives and in bargaining power.
Our approach in this paper is to seek a bargaining solution for the two-
3
part cartel based on the theory of cooperative games developed by Nash. To
this end, we find optimal trajectories for both price and the ratio of output
shares, assuming the cartel maximizes a weighted sum of the objectives (sums
of discounted profits) for each of the two groups of countries. By repeatedly
changing the weights, resolving and recomputing optimal sums of discounted
profits for each group, we compute an efficient (Pareto-optimal) frontier in
the space of realized objectives for the two groups of countries. Next, that
set of weights that corresponds to a Nash cooperative solution is found. This
corresponds to the bargaining solution, and gives us the optimal trajectories
for price and market shares.
2Source: Oil and Gas Journal, December 1975.
3As we will explain shortly, the Nash cooperative solution should not be confused
with the Nash solution for a non-cooperative game; the latter has received much
more attention by economists.
3The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section we review
the optimal monopoly pricing model for OPEC developed by Pindyck, together
with the price trajectories implied by that model. This is necessary
because we use a slightly modified version of that model to calculate r,
policies for OPEC as a two-part cartel in this paper, and also because we
wish to examine the extent to which pricing policies for a two-part cartel
would differ from those of a monopolistic cartel. The third section pre-
sents our framework of analysis for the two-part cartel; there we explain
the meaning of the Nash cooperative solution, and describe in detail how
the solution is obtained. Section 4 contains our empirical results, and
describes the characteristics of optimal prices and output shares for the
two-part cartel. Finally, we offer a summary and some concluding remarks.
2. Otimal Policies for a Mono olistic Cartel
The optimal pricing policies obtained by Pindyck for a monopolistic oil
cartel are based on a highly simplified dynamic model of the world oil market.
We review that model and its implications here since it provides the basis for
our description of the two-part cartel.4
The world oil market is described by the following equations, all of which
are parameterized to be consistent with the reserve, production, and elasticity
estimates of the OECD [11], and with average elasticity estimates obtained from
aggregate time series data:
4For a more detailed discussion of the monopolistic model and its implications
regarding the profits that OPEC can expect to accrue if it remains a cohesive
cartel, see Pindyck 13].
4TDt = 1.0 - .13Pt + .87TDt 1 + 2.3(1.015)t
St = (1.1 + .10oPt)(1.0 2 )- CS/7 + .75St_1
CSt = CSt-1 + St
Dt = TDt - St
where TDt
Dt
St
CSt
Rt
Pt
Rt = Rt_ - Dt (5)
= total demand for oil (billions of barrels per year)
= demand for cartel oil (bb/yr)
= supply of competitive fringe (bb/yr)
= cumulative supply of competitive fringe (billions of barrels)
= reserves of cartel (billions of barrels)
= price of oil ($ per barrel), in real terms.
The demand equation (1) is based on a total demand of 18 billion barrels
per year at a price of $6 per barrel, and at that price the short-run and long-
run price elasticities are .04 and .33 respectively (with a Koyck adjustment),
while at a $12 price the elasticities are .09 and .90 respectively. The last
term in the equation provides an autonomous rate of growth in demand of 1.5%
per year, corresponding to a long-run income elasticity of 0.5 and a 3% real
rate of growth in income. Equation (2) determines supply for the competitive
fringe, and is based on a level of 6.5 billion barrels per year at a $6 price.
The short-run and long-run price elasticities are .09 and .35 respectively at
the $6 price, and .16 and .52 respectively at a $12 price. Depletion of compe-
titive fringe reserves pushes the supply function to the left over time. After
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
5a cumulative production of 210 billions barrels (e.g. 7bb/yr. for 30 years)
supply would fall (assuming a fixed price) to 55% of its original value.5
The objective of the monopolistic cartel is to maximize the sum of discounted
profits:
N 1
Maxp W t 1( t - [P - 250/Rt]Dt (6)
{Pt) tml (1+6) t
Here the average cost of production for the cartel rises hyperbolically as Rt
goes to 0. The initial reserve level is taken to be 500 billion barrels, and
initial average cost is 50¢ per barrel. The planning horizon N is chosen to
be large enough to approximate the infinite-horizon problem.6
Since average costs become infinite as Rt approaches 0, a resource
exhaustion constraint need not be introduced explicitly, so that equations
(1) to (6) represent a classical, unconstrained, discrete-time optimal control
problem, and numerical solutions are easily obtained. Optimal price trajectories
for discount rates of .02, .05, and .10 are shown graphically in Figure 1, and
prices, total demand, OPEC production, OPEC reserves, and discounted profits are
given for 6 = .05 in Table 1.
Observe that the optimal monopoly price is $13 to $14 in the first year (1975),
declines over the next 5 years to around $10, and then rises slowly. This price
pattern is a characteristic result of incorporating adjustment lags in the model -
5There is no fixed upper bound on cumulative production by competitive fringe
countries; there is always some price at which additional supplies would be
forthcoming. For example, after 210 billion barrels have been produced, a
price of $18.50 would be needed to maintain production at 6.5 bb/yr.
6N=40 years usually provides a close enough approximation.
7Solutions were obtained using a general-purpose nonlinear optimal control
algorithm developed by Hnyilicza [CS ]. In calculating optimal price policies
the initial conditions were TD = 18.0, SO 6.5, CS0- O, and R 500. Price
trajectories were calculated over a 40 year horizon.
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Monopolistic Cartel: Solution for 6 = .05
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7it is optimal for OPEC to charge a higher price initially, taking advantage of the
fact that net demand can adjust only slowly. Of course, these results are dependent
on the particular model and parameter values described above. However, changing
the model's parameters has only a small effect on the numerical results. For
example, if the elasticities (short- and long-term) of total demand are doubled,
optimal prices decrease by less than 20%. Doubling the elasticity of competitive
supply results in a decrease in price of about 10%. Replacing the total demand
and competitive supply equations with isoelastic equations (using the $6 elasticities
from the linear equations) results in price trajectories that are within 15% of
those reported in Table 1. Finally, doubling or halving initial OPEC production
costs, or changing the initial level of OPEC reserves from 500 billion barrels to
800 billion barrels has little effect (less than 10%) on the optimal monopolistic
price trajectories.
3. The Two-Part Cartel: Framework of Analysis
We model the two-part cartel as consisting of a group of saver countries
that have the objective
N
MaxW1 [Pt - m/R] D (7)
.t.t 1 t
and a group of spender countries with the objective
Max W2 t [P-m2/R2] D (8)
2i, t
8Here 61 is assumed to be smaller than 628 D1 and D2 are the production
levels of each group of countries, and are determined by a division of total
cartel production:
Dt = atDt (9a)
D = (1-Bt)Dt (9b)
with 0 < t < 1. The depletion of the reserve levels for each group of countries
is accounted for by the equations
R= Rtl -D 1 (Doa)
2 2 2
Rt =t-l Dt (10b)
These equations, together with equations (1) to (4) from the previous
section, comprise our model of a two-part cartel in the world oil market. We
must now determine how the two groups of countries can cooperate to set price -
and divide up output - in an "optimal" manner. Suppose a cooperative agreement
is worked out whereby price and output shares are set to maximize a weighted sum
ofthe objectives of each group of countries:
Max W 1 + (l-a)W2 o< t 1 (11)
{Pt}
t
8If both groups of countries could borrow and lend in a perfect capital market
there would be no reason for the discount rates to differ. They cannot do this,
in part because of moral hazard, so that the discount rate reflects the use
value of the exhaustible resource (in terms of the return on domestic investment)
rather than its exchange value.
Note that this optimization problem of equations (1) to (4) and (9) to (11)
involves two control variables, price and the output share ratio t, and both
of these variables can vary over time.
By varying a between 0 and 1 and solving the resulting set of parametric
optimization problems, we obtain the Pareto-optimal frontier in the space of
realized outcomes (W1, W2), as in Figure 2. Clearly each point on the frontier
corresponds to a different trade-off between the relative objectives of the
two groups of countries. Note that the frontier need not touch the W1 or W2
axes - when a = 1, for example, no weight is assigned to W2, but the policy
that maximizes W1 might result in a W2 greater than zero.
Determining the value of a that is most likely to prevail as a result of a
negotiated agreement between the two groups of countries requires the solution of
9
a cooperative two-person game, i.e. requires a theory of bargaining. An extremely
general and robust theory of bargaining was put forth by Nash in 1953 [10] two years
after he developed his better known non-cooperative theory. We describe the Nash
solution concept briefly below.
Since each of the two parties in a bargaining game attempt to move along
the set of bargaining outcomes in opposite directions, the problem is to determine
a meaningful measure of bargaining power for the two parties. Nash's approach was
to introduce the notion of a threat point, i.e. the outcome that would result if
9The most familiar solution concepts for two-person games correspond to the class
of non-cooperative strategies in which it is assumed that the players do not
have the ability to communicate among themselves or to coordinate the selection
of a joint strategy. The classical minimax solution to the two-person zero-sum
game proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern belongs to this category. Similarly,
the notion of a Nash equilibrium strategy is a non-cooperative solution which can
be viewed as a direct generalization of the minimax concept. However, from the
standpoint of our two part cartel model for OPEC, it seems unrealistic to assume
that each of the two blocks of countries will be unaware of the decisions and
capabilities of the other and that there will be no collusion between the two
groups. It is more likely that both groups of countries will attempt to coordinate
their strategies so as to increase the net gains accruing to each-
10
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negotiations were to break down and non-cooperative behavior were to ensue. In
Figure 3 the threat point is given by (W1 , W?), and it might correspond
to the solution of a Nash non-cooperative game, or any other non-cooperative
10 o an ~ since it would
game. Obviously the bargaining set is bounded by W 1 and since it would
be irrational for either party to accept a payoff less than that resulting
from non-cooperative behavior. In broad terms, Nash's solution is based on
the premise that the relevant measure of "relative power" which determines the
outcome of the bargaining process is given by the relative utilities at the
status quo or point of no agreement. This is plausible, since the reason
each party is willing to bargain is that it expects to accrue a payoff over
and above the payoff attained at the threat point. It seems reasonable that
both parties should be willing to accept a division of the net incremental
gains in a proportion directly related to the losses incurred by not making
an agreement.1 1
Nash demonstrated that his proposed solution to the bargaining problem is
in fact the only solution (W1, W2) that satisfies axioms of rationality, feab-
ibility, Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, symmetry,
Nash also developed a solution concept for the case when the choice of the
threat point itself enters endogenously into the bargaining process. We
will not be concerned with this case here.
11An assumption for the Nash cooperative solution to hold is that both parties
must have the ability to make binding agreements, i.e. either a bargain is
agreed to, in which case both parties are committed to the strategy agreed
to, or else the outcome that will occur will be the threat point.
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and independence with respect to linear transformations of the set of payoffs.1 2
Furthermore, that solution is such that (W - W) - is maximized. This
1 1 2 2
last result makes the actual computation of the Nash solution straightforward;
the Nash solution for a is simply that point on the Pareto-optimal surface for
which the area of the shaded rectangle in Figure 3 is maximized.l4
Of course it might be reasonable to expect bargaining solutions to prevail
other than the Nash solution; for example, the two parties might behave in a
less sophisticated manner and simply divide the sum of discounted profits in
a ratio equal to that which prevailed in the preceeding two or three years.
We study the sensitivity of the Nash solution by comparing it to solutions
corresponding to other points on the Pareto-optimal frontier .
1 2Let S be the set of feasible outcomes and let (W1,W2) - (S, W,W 2) be the
bargaining solution. Then by "rationality" we mean that (W1,W2) > 1,W2),
by "feasibility" we mean that (W1 ,W2)cS, by "Pareto-optimalit' we mean that
if (W1,W2)eS and (Wl,W2)>(Wl,W2 ), then (W1 ,W 2)(Wl,W 2), by "independence of
irrelevant alternatives" we mean that if (W1,W2)eTCS and (W1,W2 )= (S,W1,W2 )
then (W1,W2) - (T,W1,W2), and by "independence of linear transformations" we
mean that if T is obtained from S by the linear transformation W1 = alWl+
and W aW+B and if (SWO,W°) - W W) then (T,a W+ 0a2W+B2)22' 1 - 1 2
* . . .... . . . .........
(alWl+Bl,a2w2+2), and by "symmetry" we mean that if S is such that (W1,W2 )eS++
(W2,W1)S, and = Wo, then W = W2. These axioms are quite general, and
could apply to many bargaining situations.
1 3For a simple proof of this, and further discussion of Nash cooperative behavior,
see Owen [12]. Further discussion is also provided by Luce and Raiffa [ 8], and
Harsanyi [ 3].
1 40ur choice of a monetary utility measure, i.e. the sum of discounted profits for
each group of countries, represents no loss of generality.
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Note that for any value of a, the optimal path for t will follow a
"bang-bang" solution. In particular, the optimal Bt will remain at zero
for some time (until spender country reserves are depleted) and then jump
to 1 (where it will remain until saver country reserves are depleted).5
It may not be realistic to expect the two groups of countries to agree to
this allocation of output even if it is optimal, since the temptation to
cheat would be considerable (and saver countries would have to risk the possi-
bility of the cartel breaking up before they even begin to deplete their
reserves). Instead we might expect the two groups to divide output in propor-
tion to historical production levels, and simply optimize with respect to price.
This would result in a different Pareto-optimal frontier, one that is closer to
the origin. We also compute solutions for this case of a fixed and constant Bt.
As we will see, under this constraint there is little room for disagreement over
price policy for the two groups of countries.
15tTo see why the solution is of this form, write the Hamiltonian for the optimal
control problem:
H= a [Ptmllt]DQ + ] (l- )-X[Dt -]t (1-8)+
(1+6Ml) ~ ~ m1/Rt]Dt~t (1+62) t
3tSt + 4tg(TDtSt,CSt,Pt)
where 1,X2,%3, and 4 are co-state variables, and g is a function determining
net demand D. Since this amiltonian is a linear function of t, it is maximized
by Bt equal to 0 or 1 (depending on whether the sum of all those terms multiplying
St is negative or positive). Since 62 > 61, the second term in H will decrease
more rapidly as t increases than will the first term. For small values of a we
would thus expect St to first be 0, and later switch to 1. When a is large
(greater than .6), Bt will switch more than once.
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4. O=timal Policies for the Two-Part Cartel
Optimal policies for the two-part cartel are obtained by solving the
optimization problem defined by equations (1)-(4) and (9)-(11), with W1 and
W2 defined by equations (7) and (8). As we explained above, the efficient
frontier (defining the locus of possible bargaining solutions) is obtained by
repeatedly resolving this optimization problem for different values of a.16
For every value of a the optimal solution calls for a division of output (Bt)
that assigns zero production to saver countries for part of the time, and zero
output to spender countries for the rest of the time. Since this may be a
politically infeasible solution- although it is economically optimal- we also
compute an efficient frontier under the constraint that St is fixed and constant
at its average historical value. We set t equal to 0.65 in computing this
second frontier.
In order to find the Nash solution on an efficient frontier it is first
necessary to obtain the "threat point," i.e. the values of W1 and W2 that would
result from non-cooperative behavior. Ideally this should be the solution to
a dynamic duppdly problem, since presumably the countries in each group would
continue to set price and output in a unified manner, but the two groups would
compete with each other. However, the solution to a dynamic duopoly problem depends
on the particular behavioral assumptions that are made, e.g. Nash (non-cooperative)
behavior, Stackelberg, etc. In addition, even using the simplest assumptions
obtaining numerical solutions for this nonlinear and non-quadratic dynamic game
problem would be computationally difficult. Therefore we compute the threat point
taking completely competitive behavior as the alternative to a negotiated agreement.
A time horizon of 40 years is used throughout; this provides a reasonably close
approximation to the infinite-horizon problem. The initial reserve level for the
saver countries is 355 billion barrels, and for the spender countries is 145
billion barrels. Initial production cost is $.50 per barrel for both groups.
a =.6
Figure 4 - Efficient Frontiers
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TABLE 2
Time-Varying B, Nash Solution (a = .35)
t B P TD D1 D2 R1 R2
1975 0 14.85 17.03 0 9.57 355.0 133.5
1976 0 12.32 16.55 0 8.66 355.0 123.9
1977 0 11.17 16.31 0 8.27 355.0 115.3
1978 0 10.71 16.20 0 8.13 355.0 107.0
1979 0 10.57 16.16 0 8.13 355.0 98.9
1980 0 10.55 16.17 0 8.20 355.0 90.7
1981 0 10.53 16.21 0 8.35 355.0 82.5
1982 0 10.33 16.32 0 8.59 355.0 74.2
1983 0 9.72 16.52 0 8.98 355.0 65.6
1984 0 8.18 16.94 0 9.71 355.0 56.6
1985 0 4.65 17.80 0 11.12 355.0 46.9
1986 1 13.62 17.43 10.48 0 355.0 35.8
1987 1 12.66 17.27 10.23 0 344.5 35.8
1988 1 12.26 17.22 10.18 0 334.3 35.8
1989 1 12.15 17.23 10.23 0 324.1 35.8
1990 1 12.19 17.28 10.34 0 313.9 35.8
1995 1 13.10 17.73 11.15 0 260.6 35.8
2000 1 14.25 18.31 12.04 0 203.1 35.8
2005 1 15.63 18.92 12.91 0 141.1 35.8
2010 1 20.34 18.82 12.75 0 75.7 35.8
W1= 2778 w2 698
17
In computing the competitive solution we assume that all producers
maximize profits taking price as given, and that they all use the same 5%
discount rate in determining output levels. 7 The competitive price begins
at $3.06 and rises slowly to $12.60 after 38 years, at which point exhaustion
occurs. Total discounted profits to saver countries (discounted at 2%) is
$1668 billion, and to spender countries (discounted at 10%) is $223 billion.
The efficient frontiers for both the time-varying and fixed cases
are shown in Figure 4 together with the threat point. For each frontier the
Nash solution (W 2 ) is found by maximizing (W1-W1) W 2-W), where (W ,W2)
is the threat point, i.e. by finding the rectangle between the threat point
and the frontier that has the largest area. The Nash solutions are shown in
the figure; for varying the solution corresponds to a - .35, and for 
fixed it corresponds to a = .30. For both solutions the values of price,
output shares, and other relevant variables are given in Tables 2 and 3.
Observe in Table 2 that when output shares can be chosen freely, the Nash
solution calls for t switching once from 0 to 1. For the first 11 years is 0
and only the spender countries produce, and after that time- at which point the
spender countries have exhausted most of their reserves - B is 1 and only the
saver countries produce. This is optimal since production by spender countries
1 7Competitive producers maximizing their sum of discounted profits must set
output balancing profits this year against profits in later years. The
resulting market price will satisfy the difference equation
Pt = (l+6)Pt-1 - 6C(Rt-1)
where C is production cost as a function of the reserve level. In addition,
the initial price must be such that market demand and supply are equal at
every point in time, and, as price rises over time, resource exhaustion occurs
at the same time that net demand goes to zero. This is shown in Pindyck [131.
Computing the optimal price trajectory for the competitive case is thus
straightforward; pick an initial P and solve over time the above equation
together with equations (1) to (5). Repeat this for different values of P0
until Dt and Rt become zero simultaneously.
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is discounted more heavily. With saver country oil losing its value less
rapidly, it is better held in the ground while spender country oil is
produced first.18
The optimal price trajectory is quite different from that in the mono-
polistic case. Initially, while spender countries are producing, the price
starts at 14.85 and falls slowly to about $10 after 8 years. This pattern
is similar to that in the monopolistic case, and takes advantage of the lag
adjustments to price changes in total demand and competitive supply. In the
next three years, however, price drops to $4.65, and then in 1986, when Bt
switches to 1 and saver countries begin producing, the price jumps back up
to nearly $14. This pattern is optimal because it permits demand to expand
again so that saver countries can charge a high price (again taking advantage
of lag adjustments) when they start producing in 1986. During the remaining
25 or 30 years the price pattern is again similar to the monopolistic case;
price drops slightly for five years, and then begins a slow, steady increase.
Although this price pattern - a sharp decline in price just before saver
countries begin producing, and then a sharp increase afterwards - will hold for
different values of a , the point at which switches from 0 to 1 will vary
considerably as a is varied. Optimal price trajectories for three values of
a (.1, .3, and .5) are shown in Figure 5. For a equal to .1, switches in
1 8This is true for values of a less than .6. For larger values of a (i.e.
assigning a larger weight to spender country profits) will begin with
a value of 1, switch to 0 after 2 or 3 years and remain at 0 for several
years, and then switch back to 1, remaining there for the rest of the
planning horizon. This double switching is a result of the discrete-time
nature of our problem, and permits saver countries to receive still larger
profits at the expense of spender countries.
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1991,19 for a equal to .3,8 switches in 1987, and for a equal to .5,8
switches in 1982. Thus when is free to vary, the optimal policy depends
highly on a , i.e. on the negotiated agreement between the two groups of
countries.
When is fixed and only price can be chosen optimally, the resulting
solution is close to the monopoly solution. There is a considerable welfare
loss, however, to both groups of countries. As can be seen in Figure 4, the
efficient frontier is much closer to the threat point when is fixed. The
Nash solution in this case corresponds to a equal to .3, and the resulting
trajectories for price and other variables are given in Table 3. By comparing
these results with those in Table 1, we see that the solution is very close to
the monopoly solution with a 5% discount rate. Since the monopoly price tra-
jectory is not very sensitive to the discount rate (see Fgure 1), there is
little that can be done without adjusting output shares to better satisfy the
different objectives of the two groups of countries. As a result, there is
very little to bargain over when is fixed. As can be seen in Figure 6,
different values of a result in optimal price trajectories that are almost
exactly the same, i.e. the price trajectory that is optimal for saver countries
is optimal for spender countries. This is reflected in the narrow range
of the efficient frontier in Figure 4.
1 9Here almost all of the weight in the objective function goes to the profits of
spender countries, so the pricing policy for the first 13 years is close to what
would be optimal for a monopolistic cartel consisting only of the spender countries.
Prices rise steply from 1980 to 1988 because spender country reserves are rela-
tively small. Even after price drops to about $2 in 1990, saver countries must
raise price more gradually in order to allow demand to increase again.
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1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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TABLE 3
Fixed ~, Nash Solution (a = .3)
t P TD D1 D2 R2
1975 14.39 17.09 6.27 3.38 347.5 141.0
1976 11.99 16.64 5.77 3.08 341.2 137.6
1977 10.88 16.44 5.49 2.96 335.5 134.5
1978 10.42 16.35 5.42 2.92 330.0 131.5
1979 10.30 16.33 5.44 2.93 324.6 128.6
1980 10.35 16.34 5.49 2.95 319.1 125.7
1981 10.48 16.37 5.56 2.99 313.6 122.7
1982 10.65 16.41 5.64 3.04 308.1 119.7
1983 10.85 16.45 5.77 3.09 302.4 116.7
1984 11.06 16.51 5.83 3.13 296.7 113.6
1985 11.28 16.56 5.92 3.19 290.8 110.4
1990 12.38 16.91 6.41 3.45 260.1 93.9
1995 13.52 17.36 6.94 3.74 227.0 76.1
2000 14.72 17.89 7.50 4.03 191.1 56.8
2005 16.12 18.47 8.04 4.33 152.5 36.0
2010 20.61 18.40 7.98 4.29 111.7 14.0
W. = 2439 W, = 4071 Z
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5. Conclusions
We have seen that most of the policy negotiations confronting a two-part
oil cartel will be over the allotment of output shares over time, since pricing
strategy follows almost directly from output strategy. In addition, the output
strategy that is optimal is a drastic one - saver countries must produce nothing
for the first 10 or 12 years. If OPEC members find this policy unacceptable
(as indeed we would expect them to) and instead hold output shares fixed, the
losses will be significant, particularly for spender countries. The Nash
solution for fixed output shares results in total discounted profits of $2439
billion and $407 billion for saver and spender countries respectively, as compared
to $2778 billion and $698 billion for the Nash solution with time-varying output
shares.
When output shares are open for policy discussion, OPEC members will have
a lot to argue about, and any resulting optimal policy will depend considerably.
on the relative bargaining power of the two groups of countries. On the other
hand when output shares are fixed, there is very little to discuss, and policy
formulation could almost be left to the computer.2 0
While it is hard to imagine OPEC members agreeing to the kinds of on-off
policies obtained in this paper, there is likely to be some flexibility in
adjusting output shares. A "compromise" policy might be adopted whereby saver
countries initially cut back production more than spender countries, but then
expand production after 10 or 15 years, either with agreed-upon cutbacks by
2 0So far OPEC policy formulation has not been relegated to a computer. For a
discussion of the ways by which OPEC arrives at a policy, see Mikdashi [9].
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spender countries (who by then may have exhausted a significant fraction of
their reserves) or with a drop in price. In fact, such a compromise policy
may be exactly what we are observing now. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the other
saver countries have been absorbing most of the cuts in production, while
Iran, Indonesia, and the other spender countries are maintaining production
levels that are much closer to full capacity. Recent OPEC prices would also
be quite consistent with such a compromise policy; recall from Tables 2 and 3
that in the Nash solution price falls from about $14 to about $10 during the
first five years for both the fixed B and time-varying cases. If such a
compromise policy has been or is about to be adopted, we would expect price
to drop somewhat in the few years before Saudi Arabia and the other saver
countries increase their production shares.
To what extent is a two-part cartel model such as ours, as opposed to a
simpler monopolistic model, needed to understand OPEC policy? We have seen
that if output shares are fixed the two-part cartel will choose the same pricing
policy as the monopolistic cartel. Output allocation, however, is likely to be
an important aspect of OPEC policy, particularly in the future as the supply of
oil from competitive fringe countries increases and OPEC is forced to cut back
production further. Recognizing that the cartel consists of producers with
somewhat different interests will be essential in predicting its response to
these future cutbacks.
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